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In The Supreme Court
of The State of Utah
ALBERT BRIDGES, and DELEEN
BRIDGES, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Case No.

vs.

12359

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY
Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This is an action for wrongful death of plaintiff's
decedent as a consequence of defendant's negligent
maintenance of its railroad crossing.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, no cause of action.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks an order remanding the case to the
trial court for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants are parents of Joseph Almon Bridges,
who was killed as a result of injuries sustained when
the automobile which he was driving collided with
the fifteenth car of defendant's train at the crossing
of the Union Pacific Railroad tracks and 1600 North
Street in Utah County, State of Utah, on October 26,
1968, at approximately 11 :45 p.m. As depicted in Exhibits 24 and 19, decedent was traveling west on a
route that took him underneath the Interstate highway across the double Denver and Rio-Grande railroad tracks to the crossing of the defendant's single
railroad track. Defendant's railroad crossing was
unprotected except by a single cross buck on the west
side of the railroad tracks; there are no signs or
markings on 1600 North Street east of the tracks to
indicate the presence of the defendant's track. The
double tracks of the Denver and Rio Grande have
red flashing electrical signaling devices. Thus, defendant's tracks have no warning devices of any type
to warn the motorist who is coming from the east to
the west that there is a railroad crossing.
Plantiffs, prior to trial and at trial, attempted to
introduce documents and testimony relating to the
2

history of the crossing. Specifically, plaintiff's atattempted to call Mel Hanks, to testify. Plaintiff
submitted a proffer of proof that, during the time
that he (Hanks) was a Utah County Commissioner,
numerous hearings were held wherein citizen complained about the above railroad crossing, specifically its lack of signal devices and that because of the
construction of the Interstate highway in the area,
the traffic which had previously traveled 1350 North
Street now had to use 1600 North Street. It was proposed that the railroad signal at the blocked off
crossing on 1350 North Street be changed to the
crossing on 1600 North Street. In July of 1963, the
Utah County Commission applied to the Utah Public
Service Commission for an order requiring the signal
to be changed.
The plaintiffs further proffered proof that if LeVern D. Green would have testified that he was and
is Utah County Engineer and that he was directed by
the County Commission to prepare an application
to the Public Service Commission to prepare an application to the Public Service Commission to relocate the red flashing electrical signal from the 1350
North Street crossing to the 16600 North Street crossing in Utah County, and he would confirm that the
condition at 1600 North Street crossing was unsafe
and that the commission wanted the signals moved
to protect the public (R. 192).
The plaintiffs proffered that if Mr. Donald Hack-
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ing, Utah Public Service Commissioner, were allowed to testify, he would have testified that he was
chairman of the Public Service Commission when the
commission considered the application of Utah County and that an investigator was sent to Utah County
who made a report to them in complete form concerning traffic patterns and recommended the installation of electrical flashing signal devices at the
1600 North Street crossing of defendant's tracks and
that the Public Service Commission entered its order
in February of 1963, based upon the findings of their
investigator (R. 192). It would also be his (Hacking's) testimony that to this date the order has not
been complied with.
The documents proposed by plaintiffs as evidence
in the case are those listed in the pre-trial order (R.
45, page 2) and defndant's motion in limine (R. 58)
which would have been introduced by the above
named witnsses.
All of the proffered testimony and exhibits were
ordered inadmissable by the trial court. At the close
of testimony, the trial court directed a verdict for defendent (R. 172) and ruled in a Minute Entry dated
July 27, 1970, that the "Court concluded that the defendant was not negligent as a matter of law, however, the court ruled that even if defendant were
negligent, that in such event, the deceased was guilty
of contributory negligence which contributory negligence would have been the proximate cause of his
4

death. Therefore, the Court granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict." ( R. 179).
STATEMENT OF POINTS

POINT 1
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW EVIDENCE ON FAILURE OF DEFENDANT, RAILROAD, TO INST ALL THE CROSSING
CONTROL SEMAPHORE SIGNALS REQUIRED
BY THE ORDER OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION AND IN REFUSING TO ADMIT
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY
CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF THE CROSSING WHICH INCLUDED THE ORDER OF THE
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUBMIT
THIS CASE TO THE JURY ON THE QUESTION OF CAMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, OR ON
THE QUESTION OF DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE OR ON THE QUESTION OF DECEDENT'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW EVIDENCE ON FAILURE OF DEFENDANT, RAILROAD, TO INSTALL THE CROSSING CONTROL SEMAPHORE SIGNALS REQUIRED BY THE ORDER OF THE PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION CONCERNING THE
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HISTORY OF THE CROSSING WHICH INCLUDED THE ORDER OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION.
In the instant case, counsel for the defendant admitted the authenticity of the Public Service Commission order and the other documents but objected
to the evidence on the grounds of competency, relevancy and materiality (R. 192).

It was vital to plaintiff's case that negligence on
the part of the defendant for not providing a safe
crossing be shown in order for plaintiffs to recover.
In the Idaho case of Van vs. Union Pacific Railroad
Company, 83 Idaho 535, 366 P2d 837 (1962) an action
was brought by a motorist who ran into a slowly moving train upon a crossing at night and was injured.
The District Court gave judgment for the motorist
on a jury verdict and on appeal to the Idaho Supreme
Court, held that the evidence presented questions for
the jury as to the negligence and contributory negligence and that instructions were not prejudicial to
the defendant railroad. The Court ruled that:
"If a reasonably prudent person would have
forseen such accident, the duty to prevent
such occurence arose, and the question of
appellant's negligence was properly submitted to the jury. Fleener vs. Oregon Slwrt

Line Railroad Company. 16 Idaho 781, 102 P
897."
6

The Idaho Court further developed the rule of law
to apply in the event the crossing is hazardous by
stating:
"Appellant (railroad) contends that no negligence has been shown on their part, as the
presence of the train itself was notice of the
hazard, and the travelers must exercise such
degree of care as the hazard present requires
and the presence of the train, being notice to
travelers, in effect absolved them from further obligation of notice. The applicability
of such doctrine, however, depends upon determination of a question of fact or inference
from the facts presented, as to whether the
train itself was visible. If the train was not
visible, the operator of a vehicle could not become aware of the incipient danger of a
blocked crossing until it becomes to late for
him to protect himself. Negligence under
such situation arises if it should have been
reasonably anticipated injury would occu._r
to one exercising due care in his driving
under all of the facts and , circumstances
present."
The rule of law for dangerous crossings was also
well tated in Finn vs. Spokane P & S Ry Company,
214 P2d 354 (1950) in which the plaintiff collided with
defendant's standing train. The District Court entered its judgment of involuntary non suit and plain7

tiff appealed. The Supreme Court of Oregon held
that the question of whether the railroad was ngligent in bloc!dng the Highway was a black gondola
car on a dark and foggy morning without the use of
flagman, flares, or other signals to warn approaching
automobiles, was for a jury and set forth a rule of
law applicable to the instant case as follows:
"Whether the crossing in question was extra
hazardous or dangerous must be determined

after a conideration of all the facts and circumstances.
A different rule would obtain, however, if
the crossing under the existing conditions
was unusually hazardous or dangerous. It
wdulo then be the duty of the railroad to use
reasonable precautions that a train blocked
the highway. Whether reasnable care under
the circumstances reuqired the use of flagman, flares or other signals would be a ques-

tion for the jury to determine. Doty v. Southern Pacific Compa,ny, 207 P2d 131; Case v.
Northern Pacific Terminal Compa,ny, 176
Or. 643, 160 P2d313; Fish v. Southern Pacific
Compa,ny, 173 Or. 294, 143 P2d 917, 145 P2d 99,
as stated in 44 Am Jur, Railroads, 7747 Section 506; 'whether or not the given crossing

is unusually dangerous is a question for a
jury, unless only one conclusion could be
drawn by all reasonable men from the evi8

dence relative hereto.' The degree of care
would be commensurate with the danger involved." (Emphasis Added).
"As to what constitutes an extra hazardous
or dangerous railroad crossing is a question
on which there is a great conflict of authority. See cases in notes; 71 ALR 1166; 10 ALR
1277. Obviously, each case depends on its own
factual situation. Courts differ in their conconclusions even though there is no material
difference in the facts. Some courts apply
lwrse and buggy rules to a motor age and
seem to imply that there can be no liability
under an factual situation. In other cases,
the railroads have practically been made insurers against injury. We do not adopt either of these extreme views." (Emphasis
added).
Further enlightenment as to what is meant by an
extra hazardous crossing is found in Personal Injury, Volume 5A, Railroads, P 266, which states that:
"The character of a crossing affects the duty
of the railroad company toward travelers on
a public highway if, under existing conditions, a railroad can reasonably anticipate
that the motorist using due care would nevertheless be likely to collide with a train at
the crossing, the crossing may be termed
extra hazardous, and the railroad must pro9

vide some special warning. The situation as
it existed at the time of the collision must be
viewed to determine whether or not the erasing was extra hazardous. A railroad crossing may present no undue danger at one
time, while at another it may be extra hazardous.
Generally, whether or not a crossing is extra
hazardous is a matter for the determination of the jury. However, an essential element of the railroad's liability is whether it
had actual or constructive knowledge of the
circumstances which authorized the jury to
find the crossing unusually dangerous.
Where the evidence shows that a 'special circumstance' had existed for such a length of
time that the railroad should have known
that the crossing was dangerous is charged
with constructive knowledge." (Emphasis
added)
An important annotation on the subject is found
in 71 ALR 369 which reports the Oklahoma case of
St. Louis San Francisco R. Company v. Prince, 291 P
973, which states that:
"Where a crossing is unusually dangerous
because of it peculiar contruction and situatin the amount of traffic passing thereover,
is the duty of the railway company to exer-
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cise such reasonable care and take such precautions as common prudence would dictate,
taking into consideration the nature of the
crssing and whether or not a given crossing
is unusually dangerous is a question for a
jury, unless only one conclusion could have
been drawn by all reasonable men from the
evidence relative thereto.'' (Emphasis added)
"Whether ordinary care or reasonably prudence requires the railroad company to erect
and maintain warning signs or other devices
in addition to those required by statute at
the crossing over a public highway in the
country which is unusually dangerous is a
question of fact for a jury."
Other cases which are in support of the rule that
the question of whether a particular railroad crossing is extra hazardous is one for the jury include
Dimick v. Northern Pacific Railway, 136 Mont. 485,
348 P2d 786 (1959) ; Walton v. Oregon Shortline Rail50 F2d 352 (9th Cir. 1931); Coffman v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry. Co., 378 SW2d 583 (Mo. 1964).
From the above state law, it was clear that plaintiffs' case would present a question to be determined
by a jury especially after a showing that the crossing was hazardous and that the railroad knew of the
hazard and was thus negligent in failing to provide
a safe crossing. Plaintiffs' case was further strengthened by the failure of the defendant to comply with
11

the Public Service Commission which had ordered
certain changes to be made stating:
"NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED, that the prposals of Utah County contained in the application herein at the
County's expense be and the same are hereby
approved in accordance with the findings
herein and such devices to be used as are
deemed necessary or required for the safety
of the public in connection with the operation, construction, and maintenance of the
said railroad crossings be made in accordance with and by agreement between the
applicant and the Union Pacific Railroad
Company and with the law and the rules
and regulations of the Commission prescribed thereunder."
Plaintiff could also rely upon the testimony of
the Utah County Commission and County Engineer
as to the dangers inherent in the crossing and of
which public complaint was made. With the above
evidence, plaintiffs could show the history of the
crossing and the fact that it was considered dangerous by many people in the area and by public bodies
charged with the duty of making and considering the
safety conditions of the railroad crossing involved.
There is no question that the Public Service Commission Order was issued and was based upon the

12

investigations and recommendations outlined in
plaintiff's proffered testimony. Had the Court admitte the Public Service order and the other documents into evidence, the jury would have had a true
picture of what precautions the public bodies had
taken to insure a safe crossing. The plaintiffs would
have had additional legal weight in its argument to
the Court an djury, because the failure of the railroad to install the signaling devices as required by
the order was negligence per se.
The order entered by the Public Service Commission is competent as admissable evidence under provisions of Utah Code Annotated, 54-7-4, which states:
"Copies of any official oocuments or orders
filed or deposited according to the order of
the commissioner, certified by the commissioner or by a secretary or assistant secretary under the official seal of the commision
to be true copies of the originals, shall be evidnce in the same manner as the originals."
Jones on Evidence, Volume 3, Section 544,
page 1057, states:
"Where a person in public office has been
required by statute or by the nature of its
office to write down particular transactions
occurring in the course of his public duties
and under his personal observation, the record is generally held to be inadmissable in
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evidence. Such entries are generally made
by those who can have no motive to supress
the truth or to fabricate testimony moreover.
They are made in the discharge of duty pursuant to an oath of office, and to satisfy the
rule against heresay have the earmarks of
inherent trustworthiness."
In the instant, case counsel for defendant admitted
the authenticity of the order but objected to its materiality, competency, and relevancy. Courts presume
that the hearing for the order was based upon proper
evidence and supported by evidence based upon valid
and reasonable regulations. Nichols Applied Evidence, Vol. 4, page 3837. That the order of the Public
Service Commission was based upon sufficient evidence at a regularly held meeting was not disputed,
and the document, therefore, speaks for itself.
The order of the Public Service Commission is vital
to the instant case in that it involves a determination
which affects the very crossing at which the collision
took place, and the failure to admit the order and its
attendant testimony deprives the plaintiffs of evidence of negligence on the part of the· railroad. The
order can be used in three ways by the plaintiffs. The
first is to show the existence of a dangerous condition or extra hazardous crossing which was brought
to the attention of the Public Service Commission
which ruled that additional warning devices must be

14

installed at the crossing. The second, would be to
show that the order of the Public Service Commission
was not carried out, which has generally been held
by the courts to be negligence per se. And a third use,
is that the order is notice to the railroad company of
a dangerous condition which the railroad company
then has a duty to rectify. In any of the above approaches, the plaintiff's purpose would be to show
negligence on the part of the railroad.
There are several cases in support of appellant's
position that the failure of defendant to comply with
the order of the Public Service Commission constitutes negligence per se. In Baltimore and Ohio Railroad v. Felgenhauer, 168 F2d 12 (8th Circuit, 1948),
the Court held that where a railroad failed to install
or maintain gates or other protective devices ordered
by the authorized administrative agencies, such violation was held to be negligence per se. Wilcox v.
Southern Pacific Railroad Company, 190 Cal2d 548,
12 Cal Reporter 207, it was held that the jury must
be instructed on the effect of a technical violation
of the public utility commission safety order relating
to the installation of blinker lights on a railroad
crossing as constituting negligence per se.

It is for the traveling public that such orders of
the Public Service Commission are given. In the case
of Utah Light and Traction Company v. Public Service Commission, 118 P2d 683, it states:
"The welfare of the public is the paramount
15

issue. These rights are given and regulated
to protect the people generally and to achieve
an opportunity for all individuals, and each
community to grow and develop and insure
its inhabitants of the most complete and
abundant life possible commencerate with
the equal privilege for all others.''

It is submitted that appellants in this matter, as
the heirs of the deceased minor, Joseph Bridges, are
the direct beneficiaries of the order of the Public
Service Commission which was promulgated for the
protection and welfare of the public which in this
specific case was protection at a railroad crossing.
Thus, the installation of a warning device is not for
the railroad or for the county who owns the highway,
but is for the motorist in an effort to create a safer
crossing. It is further submitted that the failure of
the railroad to install a warning device after it knew
of the concern of Utah County and particularly after
the order of the Public Service Commission directing
that a warning device be placed at the crossing, is
sufficient notice to the railroad that a dangerous
condition at the crosing exists and that failure to
install the warning device is negligence per se. Had
the Court ruled the testimony and documents admissable, the question of negligence would have been a
jury question and the jury would have had the information upon which it could make a determination
that the crossing was hazardous and that the railroad

16

company was negligent.
The Court's basis for denying the testimony and
exhibits was that the determination of the Utah
County Commission and Utah Public Service Commission usurped the role of the jury in determining
the ultimate question which the Court concluded was
that the crossing was in fact hazardous. Query, how
is the jury to know whether a crossing is hazardous
unless it receives tetimony and opinion of witnesses
to frame the issue in its proper perspective considering all available information? Certainly the question
of whether or not the crossing was hazardous was
not the ultimate question. The ultimate question was
whether the defendant was negligent and if the dececeased was contributorily negligent. Thus, the
court effectively denied plaintiffs of the most effective and meaningful testimony and exhibits as to the
unsafe and hazardous nature of the crossing, and by
so doing, the jury was deprived of information as to
the nature of the crossing on which they could find
negligence on the part of the defendant.
Certainly the railroad has the right to rebut any
testimony of the witnesses proposed by plaintiffs
and could explain the railroad's reasons for not complying with the Public Service Commission order.
The effect of the testimony would be to show that
the railroad was on notice of the dangerous and unsafe condition and they had been ordered to make
the crossing more safe by the addition of signal lights

17

which they had failed to do. The question of whether
this constituted negligence would then be a question
for the jury unless the Court ruled that such failure
was negligence per se, in which case, the jury would
consider whether or not the negligence of the railroad
company was the proximate cause of the accident.
The trial Court erred in not allowing the above
testimony into evidence. The evidence dealt directly
with the issue at hand which was defendant's negligence in maintaining an unsafe crossing. The law is
clear that in the event that such information had
been allowed into testimony, the question of defendant's negligence and plaintiff's contributory negligence was one for a jury to determine.

POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUBMIT
THIS CASE TO THE JURY ON THE QUESTION
OF DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE OR ON THE
QUESTION OF DECEDENT'S CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE.
In the instant case, there should have been two
questions before the jury: the first being a question
of defendant's negligence and th second questions
being that of the decedent's negligence. As discussed
above in Point I, the question of a hazardous crossing
and the duty of the railroad to maintain a safe crossing are questions for the jury. It is submitted that
the law allows the judge to direct a verdict only when
18

one conclusion could be drawn by all reasonable men
from the evidence relative thereto. There was other
evidence as to the unsafe nature of the crossing other
than the testimony and exhibits listed in Point 1
which were brought out a trial. It is submitted that
based upon the law cited in appellant's Point I, it is
not proper for the trial court to direct a verdict as a
matter of law when questions of fact were involved.

The instant case is the perfect situation for an instruction on comparative negligence. The doctrine
of contributory negligence is a creature of the courts
and often works to the detriment of plaintiff's whose
cause of action before the court is just and equitable,
but who nevertheless are denied recovery. A better
and more enlightened rule is to allow recovery but
have the award reduced in accordance to comparative
negligence. Thus, if the jury can decide more fairly
the relative fault of the parties, most legal scholars
and certainly the more progressive courts have abandoned the old and inequitable rule of contributory
negligence. The rule is well established in federal
employee liability act cases in the state of Utah, however the rule in the state courts of Utah in the past
'
has been
based on contributory negligence. The real
question raised by the appeal is whether that rule
(contributory negligence) is one based on justice and
right. Sometime, some Court in Utah will, because of
the fundamental principles involved, chart a new
course of substantive law based on comparative negli-

19

gence. Why cannot it be this court at this time with
this case.
A recent authority on the subject is the case of
Maki v. Frelk, 289 NE2d 384 (ill.App. 1967). This
case involved a wrongful death at an intersection
and in that regard is quite similar to the instant case.
Although the decision of the Illinois Appellate Court
has been overruled, that court held, and we paraphrase:
1. Rule of stare decisis was no bar to court
abolition of the inequitable and unjust contributory negligence doctrine.
2. In light of present day conditions, the contributory negligence rule should be changed
and overruled.
3. The doctrine of contributory negligence
was created by the courts not by the legislature. If we have created it and it does not
meet with present day life, then we are duty
bound to abolish it.
4. The doctrine of contributory negligence
was a creature of the courts and having
found the doctrine to be unsound and unjust
under present day conditions, the courts
have not only the right, but the duty to
abolish the defense.
5. We, accordingly, find that it is and should
20

be the public policy of Illinois that commencing with the date upon which this decision becomes final in this case, contributory
negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as great as
the negligence of the person against whom
recovery is sought, but any damages allowed
shall be diminished in proportion to the
amount of negligence attributable to the
person recovering.
Other authorities are cited by an American Trial
Lawyers Association publication standing for the
superiority of comparative negligence doctrine over
the contributory negligence doctrine: Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 Michigan Law Review 465
(1953); Mallony, "From Contributory to Compa.rative Negligence: A Needed Law Reform", 11 University of Florida Law Review (1935) (1958); Dobbs,
Comparative Negligence, A Study For Arkansas
Lawyers,'' 10 Arkansas Law Review 54 (1956) ; Mole
and Wilson, "A Study of Compa.rative Negligence,
17 Cornell Law Quarterly 333, 604 (1932). Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 Chicago Kent
L. Rev. 189, 304 (1950); Philbrick, Loss Apportionment in Negligence Cases, 00 U.P.L. Rev. 572, 766
(1951); Note, 11 Ark. L. Rev. 391 (1958); 10 Ark. L.
21

Rev. 54-100 (1956) (valuable symposium); Rosenberg,

Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: A 'Before and
After' Survey, 13 Ark. L. Rev. 89 (1959).
Peck, Comparative Negligence and Automobile
Liability Insurance, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 689 (1960) (on
the legitimacy of judges abolishing the harsh doctrine of Contributory Negligence and adopting Comparative Negligence without the need for legislative
intervention by statute, see Professor Robert E. Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75
Harvard L. Rev. 463, 506-509 (1962) proposing judicial abrogation of contributory negligence);
Seavey, Cogitations on Torts, 55-57 (1954) (on superiority of judicial reform of law to legislative, see
Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislature in the
Reform of Tort Law, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 265 (1963);
Keeton, Judicial Law Reform -

A perspective on
the Performance of the Appellate Courts, 44 Texas
L. Rev. 1254 (July 1966);
cf. Leach, Revisionism in the House of Lords: The
Bastion of Rigid Stare Decisis Falls, 80 Harvard L.
Rev. 797 (February 1967).

It is submitted that in the event that this court
remands the case for a new trial, that it should be
upon the basis of Comparative Negligence. Such a
ruling would bring the present general railroad law
into line with the FELA cases based on comparative
22

negligence and would return justice to the inequitable law which has developed concerning railroad
crossing cases.
CONCLUSION
It was error in law committed by the trial court to

exclude the proffered testimony and exhibits of plaintiffs relative to the railroad crossing in question and
that such testimony and exhibits are admissable to
show defendant's negligence and the case should be
remanded to the lower court for a new trial with
directions to the lower court concerning the admissability of the proffered testimony and exhibits with
further instructions to submi he case to the jury on
the principle of comparative negligence.
Respectfully submitted,
Jackson Howard
HOW ARD & LEWIS
Delphi Building
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorney for Appellant
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